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DON’T FEED THE DEER: MISAPPLICATIONS OF 
STATUTORY VAGUENESS AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
OVERBREADTH DOCTRINE 
 
COUNTY COURT, SULLIVAN COUNTY 
NEW YORK 
People v. Gabriel1 
(decided September 5, 2012) 
 
Appellant Robert Gabriel was convicted in the Town of High-
land Justice Court for violating a provision of the New York State 
Environmental Conservation Law prohibiting feeding wild white-
tailed deer or wild moose save for five enumerated exceptions.2  On 
appeal, the County Court addressed three issues: first, whether suffi-
cient evidence existed to convict the appellant of feeding white-tailed 
deer in violation of the statute; second, whether the statute was un-
constitutionally vague, both facially and as applied; and third, wheth-
er the statutory limitation upon First Amendment rights was unconsti-
tutionally overbroad.3  The first issue was summarily resolved by the 
appellant’s admission of placing food in his backyard that attracted 
deer, which under the statutory language constituted “feeding.”4  Ap-
plying a two-part test to the second issue, statutory vagueness, the 
court concluded the statutory language neither provided adequate no-
tice for a “person of ordinary intelligence” nor “clear standards of en-
forcement” for officials.5  Consequently, the court held the statute 
both facially vague and vague as applied, and therefore violative of 
 
1 950 N.Y.S.2d 874 (Co. Ct. 2012). 
2 Id. at 877-78; N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 6, § 189.3 (2010). 
3 Gabriel, 950 N.Y.S.2d at 879-81. 
4 Id. at 880 (“ ‘Feed’ or ‘feeding’ is defined as ‘the act of using, placing, giving, exposing, 
depositing, distributing or scattering any material, or any act to maintain the availability of 
such material, that attracts wild white-tailed deer to feed on such material including the dis-
tribution of such material in deer wintering areas.’ ” (quoting N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. 
tit. 6, § 189.2(f))). 
5 Id. at 881-83. 
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Gabriel’s constitutional right to due process.6  Finally, the court ex-
amined the statute under the First Amendment’s “overbreadth doc-
trine.”7  It forged a link between feeding wild animals and First 
Amendment speech protections by claiming that the former could be 
expressive conduct in support of conservation.8  Under this rubric it 
held the statute’s prohibition of actions and materials that could “at-
tract” or “feed” white-tailed deer was unconstitutionally broad.9 
This Note surveys the New York and federal approaches to 
statutory vagueness and First Amendment overbreadth challenges.  
Part I.A discusses the facts of People v. Gabriel, which is the subject 
of this article’s critique in Part IV.  Parts I.B and I.C examine the de-
cision’s resolution of statutory vagueness and overbreadth claims re-
spectively.  Part II.A analyzes the federal method applied to resolving 
statutory vagueness challenges.  Part II.B explores federal First 
Amendment overbreadth jurisprudence.  Part III.A reviews New 
York’s approach to statutory vagueness claims, illustrating doctrinal 
dissension where the challenge is facial rather than as applied.  Part 
III.B examines the overbreadth doctrine in New York case law, 
which mirrors its federal counterpart.  Part IV evaluates the court’s 
decision in People v. Gabriel, proffering that it incorrectly resolved 
statutory vagueness and overbreadth challenges in a manner perverse 
to both federal and New York jurisprudence. 
I. THE OPINION 
A. Facts 
On October 13, 2009, Department of Environmental Conser-
vation (“DEC”) officer Michael Bello received an anonymous call 
about a pile of apples and a deer stand located in the woods behind 
the appellant’s property.10  Suspicious of possible DEC violations in 
the wake of the approaching hunting season, officer Bello proceeded 
 
6 Id. at 884. 
7 Id. (“The First Amendment overbreadth doctrine provides that ‘a statute that attempts to 
proscribe constitutionally protected speech will not be enforced unless a limiting construc-
tion effectively removes the apparent threat to constitutionally protected expression.’ ” 
(quoting People v. Foley, 731 N.E.2d 123, 128 (N.Y. 2000))). 
8 Gabriel, 950 N.Y.S.2d at 884. 
9 Id. at 886. 
10 Id. at 878. 
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to stake out the location, during which he viewed no activity at the 
deer stand.11  During the following several days, he received two 
more calls and proceeded to further investigate the area.12  These sub-
sequent investigations indicated that deer had been feeding on the 
trail near the stand.13  In light of these indications, officer Bello 
knocked on the door of the property and inquired into the circum-
stances.14  Gabriel told officer Bello that he was unaware of the deer 
stand and that he occasionally fed animals that came into his back-
yard.15  Gabriel conceded that he placed apples in the backyard to 
feed wildlife, though he denied feeding deer.16  At the bench trial, 
Gabriel inquired into whether it was an offense to merely throw ap-
ples into his backyard and the judge responded, “You are not allowed 
to throw those apples out there.  You are not permitted to do it . . . .  I 
understand that if you have a bird feeder in your yard that attracts the 
deer, we can get in trouble for that.”17  Although Gabriel failed to 
preserve certain issues at trial, the County Court exercised its discre-
tion to review them as a matter of justice and because they raised 
constitutional concerns.18  Specifically, Gabriel challenged the consti-
tutionality of the statute’s vagueness and overbreadth.19 
B. Constitutional Claims: Vagueness 
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment pro-
hibits conviction under a law that “fails to provide a person of ordi-
nary intelligence fair notice of what is prohibited, or is so 
standardless that it authorizes or encourages seriously discriminatory 
enforcement.”20  Effectuating this doctrine, the court laid out a two-
part test to determine whether the statute was unconstitutionally 
vague under the Due Process Clause.21  The first part requires a de-
 
11 Id. 
12 Id. 
13 Gabriel, 950 N.Y.S.2d at 878 (Officer Bello noted deer droppings and a photograph 
from a “trail cam” as evidence that deer had been feeding in the area). 
14 Id. 
15 Id. at 878-79. 
16 Id. at 879. 
17 Id. (emphasis in original). 
18 Gabriel, 950 N.Y.S.2d at 879. 
19 Id. at 881. 
20 Id. (quoting Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2718 (2010)). 
21 Id. at 881. 
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termination that the law provides a person of ordinary intelligence 
with fair notice of the prohibited action.22  The second part necessi-
tates clear standards of enforcement for officials tasked with execut-
ing the law.23  Gabriel asserted that the statute was both facially 
vague and vague as applied to his particular case.24  The court ad-
dressed the facial challenge first.25 
The ambiguity at issue stemmed from the meaning of the 
words “material” and “feeding” in NYCRR title 6, section 189.  Ap-
plying the test’s first prong, the court determined that because the 
statute failed to expand on what constituted “material,” and also what 
actions would be considered “feeding,” the statute gave inadequate 
notice of the prohibited actions.26  It determined that “a person of or-
dinary intelligence” would be unable to ascertain whether his or her 
actions were illegal.27  Similarly, officials charged with implementing 
the law lacked sufficient guidance regarding what activities were 
prohibited.28  The resultant opacity, the court reasoned, enhanced the 
potential for discriminatory and arbitrary enforcement.29  Resolving 
the statute’s facial ambiguity, the court held that because it was fa-
cially vague, its application to Gabriel was unconstitutional.30 
C. Constitutional Claims: Overbreadth 
Before evaluating the statute’s alleged overbreadth, the court 
affirmed Gabriel’s standing to bring the issue.31  It reasoned that alt-
hough his conduct was unprotected by the First Amendment, his 
challenge was nonetheless proper under its overbreadth doctrine.32  
 
22 Id. 
23 Gabriel, 950 N.Y.S.2d at 881. 
24 Id. at 882. 
25 Id. 
26 Id. at 882. 
27 Id.  The court gave as examples seemingly harmless and ordinary actions that could be 
held illegal under the statute if they attracted deer, such as planting a fruit tree or putting out 
garbage that may contain “material.”  Gabriel, 950 N.Y.S.2d at 882. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. 
30 Id. at 883.  Subsequent to this determination, the court also held that had the statute not 
been facially vague, its application to Gabriel would have been unconstitutionally vague as 
applied.  Id. at 884. 
31 Gabriel, 950 N.Y.S.2d at 884. 
32 Id. at 884 (“The First Amendment overbreadth doctrine provides that ‘a statute that at-
tempts to proscribe constitutionally protected speech will not be enforced unless a limiting 
construction effectively removes the apparent threat to constitutionally protected expres-
4
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Effectively, due to the statute’s potential to limit protected speech 
and its lack of any limiting construction, the court allowed Gabriel to 
raise the First Amendment challenge.33 
In a manner similar to its Due Process analysis, the court 
enunciated several factors to determine whether a statute was over-
broad.  It began with the notion that if the statute “on its face,” that is 
to say in its aggregate rather than in single conceived applications, 
prohibits a substantial amount of protected conduct, then it is over-
broad.34  Additionally, the court warned that regulations of protected 
speech “must be narrowly tailored to serve the government’s legiti-
mate interest.”35  This requirement demands that prohibitions not be 
substantially broader than necessary to achieve that legitimate gov-
ernmental interest.36  Proceeding to implement these analyses, the 
court determined the conduct prohibited by the statute could be an 
expression of support for conservation.37  Thus, the conduct could be 
evaluated as a First Amendment protection, triggering the foregoing 
restraints on overbreadth. 
The court refrained from an extensive examination of the 
statute’s substantive legitimacy, although it indicated doubts about it, 
and instead focused on its scope.38  Excoriating the statute’s 
overbreadth came as a corollary to the court’s treatment of the statu-
tory vagueness issue.  The broad language that clouded the statute’s 
meaning also expanded the breadth of conduct which could reasona-
bly be interpreted as impermissible.39  Recognizing this, the court 
held the statute’s language rendered it substantially overbroad, and 
“not narrowly tailored to serve significant governmental interests.”40  
The statute’s overbreadth and vagueness implicated one another, as 
 
sion.’ ”) (quoting Foley, 731 N.E.2d at 128)). 
33 Id. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. at 885. 
36 Gabriel, 950 N.Y.S.2d at 885. 
37 Id. at 884. 
38 See id. (“There is a genuine dispute as to whether this regulation serves a significant 
governmental interest in preventing the spread of CWD.  Without addressing the merits of 
CWD regulations as applicable in New York, the Court must ask if the gathering of deer 
around a legal food plot as opposed to the proverbial apple tree is not also a concern for 
CWD transmission?”). 
39 See id at 885 (“Not only does this statute criminalize any type of feeding of deer, but 
broad language like ‘placing,’ ‘exposing,’ or ‘depositing’ creates myriad situations in which 
one could violate the statute without any intention of feeding deer or moose.”). 
40 Id. at 885. 
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the court concluded “[t]he broad sweeping language of the regulation 
chills constitutionally protected conduct and leaves law enforcement 
in a position to arbitrarily enforce the law.  The literal meaning of 
words like ‘material,’ ‘deposit’ and ‘maintain’ leave open an applica-
tion of the regulation far beyond what the legislature plausibly in-
tended.”41 
II. FEDERAL APPROACH 
A. Vagueness 
Federal jurisprudence is replete with challenges arising from 
purported statutory vagueness and their resolution by its “void-for-
vagueness” doctrine rests on settled principles.42  Throughout the 
greater part of the Supreme Court’s history, these challenges have 
been mechanisms for social, political, and economic action.43  Pri-
marily at issue are notions of due process arising under the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments.44  However, the interpretive breadth result-
ing from statutory vagueness may also implicate constitutionally pro-
tected speech, raising First Amendment concerns.45  The Supreme 
Court has developed a two-part analysis for resolving these challeng-
es, which is modified when protected speech is affected,46 known as 
the void-for-vagueness doctrine.47 
The first part examines whether the statute provides proper 
notice or fair warning of the prohibited conduct.48  Courts have 
hinged proper notice on whether “a person of ordinary intelligence 
 
41 Gabriel, 950 N.Y.S.2d at 886. 
42 See Andrew E. Goldsmith, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 
Revisited, 30 AM. J. CRIM. L. 279 (2003) (discussing the long history of constitutional chal-
lenges to statutory vagueness); Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 572 n.7 (1974) (“The ele-
ments of the void-for-vagueness doctrine have been developed in a large body of precedent 
from this Court.”). 
43 Goldsmith, supra note 42. 
44 The Fifth Amendment guarantees due process against federal action whereas the Four-
teenth Amendment does so against state action.  See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) 
(discussing various protections provided by the Fourteenth Amendment against state action). 
45 Goguen, 415 U.S. at 573. 
46 Id. at n.10. 
47 While the analysis has two “prongs,” both are not required to invalidate a statute for 
vagueness.  See City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 64 (1999) (invalidating ordinance 
solely on its failure to limit discretionary enforcement by police). 
48 Holder, 130 S. Ct. at 2718. 
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[would have] fair notice of what is prohibited.”49  Indeed, the princi-
ple is an axiom of laws that comport with due process.50  However, 
like the statutes to which it is applied, the language is often ambigu-
ous regarding what its interpretation entails.51  Whether a statute pro-
vides proper notice is an inherently flexible and often unclear deter-
mination.52  Consequently, as Justice Holmes ominously observed, 
“[T]he law is full of instances where a man’s fate depends on his es-
timating rightly . . . .  If his judgment is wrong, not only may he incur 
a fine or a short imprisonment . . . [but] he may incur the penalty of 
death.”53  Incident to the first part, the second requires that the statute 
provide clear standards of enforcement for officials tasked with its 
implementation.54  This second requirement ensures protection 
against “arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.”55  Additionally, 
where the degree of statutory vagueness encroaches on protected 
speech by dissuading people from engaging in such speech, courts 
have required a heightened degree of specificity.56  The foregoing 
analysis was on display in Smith v. Goguen.57 
In Goguen, the defendant was convicted of violating a Massa-
chusetts flag misuse statute, which prohibited mutilating, trampling 
upon, defacing, or treating contemptuously the flag of the United 
States.58  He had worn a small patch of the flag sewn onto the seat of 
his trousers and was charged with “contemptuously [treating] the flag 
of the United States” and sentenced to six months in jail.59  Applying 
 
49 Id. 
50 See Connally v. Gen. Const. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926) (“[A] statute which either 
forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence 
must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application violates the first essen-
tial of due process of law.”); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972) (“It is a 
basic principle of due process that an enactment is void for vagueness if its prohibitions are 
not clearly defined.”). 
51 Goldsmith, supra note 42, at 280-81 (claiming the Supreme Court has issued sweeping 
and contradictory statements on the vagueness doctrine). 
52 Grayned, 408 U.S. at 110 (“Condemned to the use of words, we can never expect math-
ematical certainty from our language.”). 
53 Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373, 377 (1913). 
54 Goguen, 415 U.S. at 573. 
55 Id.; Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108-09 (“A vague law impermissibly delegates basic policy 
matters to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, 
with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory application.”). 
56 Goguen, 415 U.S. at 573. 
57 Id. 
58 Id. at 568-69. 
59 Id. at 568, 570. 
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the void-for-vagueness doctrine, the Court characterized the statutory 
language at issue as “vague ‘not in the sense that it requires a person 
to conform his conduct to an imprecise but comprehensible norma-
tive standard, but rather in the sense that no standard of conduct is 
specified at all.’ ”60  Such deficiencies preclude cognizant inclusion 
in and exclusion from prohibited conduct, wherein lies the Due Pro-
cess offense.61 
Addressing the standards provided for enforcement, the Court 
lambasted the language as “allow[ing] policemen, prosecutors, and 
juries to pursue their personal predilections.”62  Further, deeming the 
language that the defendant was convicted under as “capable of 
reaching expression sheltered by the First Amendment,” the Court 
held a greater degree of specificity was required to save the statute.63  
The Goguen decision illustrates that while federal courts are con-
cerned with proper notice being provided to citizens, of greater con-
cern is the potential for unchecked and possibly discriminatory en-
forcement granted by vague statutes.64 
B. Overbreadth 
Generally, a person to whom a statute may be constitutionally 
applied lacks the standing to challenge that statute’s constitutionality 
as applied to other litigants.65  The First Amendment Overbreadth 
Doctrine is an exception to this generality.66  Federal courts have rec-
ognized that elastic boundaries circumscribe the First Amendment 
and thus its treatment should allow it to pulsate.67  Bearing that in 
mind, the Supreme Court has permitted litigants to challenge a stat-
ute’s validity, notwithstanding its applicability to their situation, 
 
60 Id. at 578 (quoting Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614 (1971)). 
61 Goguen, 415 U.S. at 578. 
62 Id. at 575. 
63 Id. at 573.  The Court also made a comparison to the less exacting degree of specificity 
required for statutes “regulating purely economic activity,” whose scope does raise the same 
First Amendment concerns.  Id. at n.10. 
64 See id. at 575 (“Mr. Justice Black, in a concurring opinion, voiced a concern, which we 
share, against entrusting lawmaking ‘to the moment-to-moment judgment of the policeman 
on his beat.’ ”); Goguen, 415 U.S. at 578 (“The deficiency is particularly objectionable in 
view of the unfettered latitude thereby accorded law enforcement officials and triers of 
fact.”) (emphasis added). 
65 Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 610 (1973). 
66 Id. at 612-13. 
67 Id. at 611. 
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when it is substantially overbroad.68  The Court has, however, recog-
nized the severe implications of such action,69 and accordingly has 
applied it “sparingly and only as a last resort . . . [and not] when a 
limiting construction has been or could be placed on the challenged 
statute.”70  Further, it has qualified the doctrine’s application depend-
ing on whether speech or conduct was being regulated.71  Particular 
attention has been given to the latter, where the Court has required 
that the overbreadth be “real, but substantial as well, judged in rela-
tion to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep.”72  In Virginia v. Hicks73 
the Court illustrated the doctrine’s stringency when applied to con-
duct.74 
The regulation at issue in Hicks was promulgated by The 
Richmond Redevelopment and Housing Authority (“RRHA”), a Vir-
ginia state agency, which authorized police to serve notice upon any 
individual whose presence on its property lacked “a legitimate busi-
ness or social purpose;” and further, to subsequently arrest the person 
if the notice went unheeded.75  Respondent Hicks, after violating the 
regulation several times, was convicted under Virginia’s repeat tres-
pass statute.76  Conceding his conduct was not constitutionally pro-
tected and that the trespass statute he was charged under was valid, 
Hicks challenged the constitutional validity of the RRHA policy as 
overbroad.77  Addressing that contention, the Court re-affirmed prin-
ciples enunciated in Broadrick v. Oklahoma.78  It cautioned that fa-
cially invalidating a law may vitiate the benefits sought by narrowing 
its expansive scope.79  Moreover, it counseled that “there are substan-
tial social costs created by the overbreadth doctrine when it blocks 
application of a law[,] . . . especially to constitutionally unprotected 
 
68 Id. at 619.  The Supreme Court’s rationale stemmed from “a judicial prediction or as-
sumption that the statute’s very existence may cause others not before the court to refrain 
from constitutionally protected speech or expression.”  Id. at 612. 
69 See Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 613 (calling the doctrine’s application “strong medicine”). 
70 Id. at 613. 
71 Id. at 615. 
72 Id. 
73 539 U.S. 113 (2003). 
74 Id. 
75 Id. at 116. 
76 Id. at 117. 
77 Id. at 118. 
78 Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 610. 
79 Hicks, 539 U.S. at 119. 
9
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conduct.”80 
In denying Hicks’s claim, the court held the RRHA policy did 
not prohibit a substantial amount of protected speech.81  Because the 
policy language “legitimate business or social purpose” applied to all 
forms of conduct, the Court reasoned, the degree of protected conduct 
which may possibly be prohibited was minimal compared with the 
valid prohibitions against non-constitutionally protected conduct.82  
The Court reinforced its conclusion stating it was “not surprising, 
since the overbreadth doctrine’s concern with ‘chilling’ protected 
speech ‘attenuates as the otherwise unprotected behavior that it for-
bids the State to sanction moves from ‘pure speech’  toward  con-
duct.’ ” 83  And additionally, “[r]arely, if ever, will an overbreadth 
challenge succeed against a law or regulation that is not specifically 
addressed to speech or to conduct necessarily associated with speech 
(such as picketing or demonstrating).”84 
III. NEW YORK APPROACH 
A. Statutory Vagueness: As Applied and Facially 
Similar to federal courts, New York employs the aforemen-
tioned void-for-vagueness doctrine to resolve statutory vagueness 
challenges.85  The Court of Appeals has distinguished as applied chal-
lenges from facial challenges based on what they entail and how their 
resolutions affect each other.86  A determination that a statute is 
vague as applied rests on finding its constitutional application to the 
challenger’s particular facts.87  In contrast, a challenge to a statute’s 
facial validity requires the “heavy burden” of proving the statute is 
vague in all its applications.88  Courts are reticent to hold a statute fa-
 
80 Id. 
81 Id. at 124. 
82 Id. at 123. 
83 Id. at 124 (quoting Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 615). 
84 Hicks, 539 U.S. at 124. 
85 People v. Stuart, 797 N.E.2d 28, 34 (N.Y. 2003). 
86 Id. at 36. 
87 Id. at 35. 
88 Id.  Courts are especially concerned with statutes that fail to specify standards of con-
duct, with the concern being arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement.  See Goguen, 415 U.S. 
at 575.  Similar to federal courts, the New York Court of Appeals has hinted that the second 
prong, standards of enforcement, may be the most important.  See People v. Nelson, 506 
10
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cially vague because such a decision invalidates it entirely, as op-
posed to finding a statute is vague as applied, which only bars its ap-
plication in the particular instance.89  Consequently, the New York 
approach first examines the statutory validity as applied to the situa-
tion at issue.90 
If the court determines a statute is constitutionally permissible 
as applied, it will further reach the tacit conclusion that it is also fa-
cially constitutional.91  This rule, known as the “no valid applications 
rule,” is premised on the idea that if “there was at least one person as 
to whom the statute could be applied constitutionally, [it is] implicitly 
determined [to be] valid on its face.”92  While the principles of fair-
ness underlying the void-for-vagueness doctrine stem from common 
notions of reason and natural law,93 there has been discord within 
New York’s highest court over the validity of the “no valid applica-
tions rule.”  This disagreement and New York’s approach to statutory 
vagueness challenges were displayed in People v. Stuart.94 
Stuart concerned as applied and facial vagueness challenges 
to a New York statute prohibiting stalking.95  The statutory language 
at issue was “no legitimate purpose,” which the defendant claimed 
was insufficient to provide a person of ordinary intelligence proper 
 
N.E.2d 907, 909 (N.Y. 1987) (“The Constitution abhors a law placing unfettered discretion 
in the hands of police, prosecutors and juries and allowing punishment of the poor or unpop-
ular on a whim.”); Stuart, 797 N.E.2d at 35 (holding adequate guidelines for law enforce-
ment may be the vagueness doctrine’s most important aspect). 
89 Stuart, 797 N.E.2d at 35-36. 
90 Id. at 36. 
91 Id. 
92 Id. at 37. 
93 See id. at 33 (“It is axiomatic that a proscriptive law must provide people with reasona-
ble notice of the conduct it prohibits.”). 
94 Stuart, 797 N.E.2d at 37. 
95 Id.  The stalking statute at issue, “Stalking in the fourth degree,” provided in relevant 
part: 
[A] person is guilty of stalking in the fourth degree if he or she (1) intention-
ally and for no legitimate purpose (2) engages in a course of conduct directed 
at a specific person (3) when he knows or reasonably should know that his 
conduct will have either of two consequences: first, that it is likely to cause 
reasonable fear of material harm to the victim’s (or other specified third par-
ty’s) physical health, safety or property . . . or second, that the conduct caus-
es material harm to the victim’s mental or emotional health and consists of 
following, telephoning or initiating communication with the victim (or other 
specified third party) after being clearly told to stop. 
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 120.45 (McKinney 1999). 
11
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notice.96  He further contested the statute’s failure to qualify the type 
of intent that was prohibited.97  Specifically, the statute proscribed a 
course of conduct, but not the ends intended to be reached by that 
conduct, which the defendant alleged compounded the vagueness.98  
In this regard, the defendant argued that the statute fell short of 
achieving sufficient clarity.99 
Addressing these challenges, the court held the statutory con-
duct was clearly delineated, thus a perpetrator’s intent was irrele-
vant.100  Here, the defendant continuously followed, stared at, and ap-
proached the complainant.101  Under the statutorily proscribed 
conduct, the defendant had ample notice that his actions were prohib-
ited and any reasonable person could have understood as much.102  
Further, the language “legitimate purpose,”103 the court reasoned, 
should be read as its ordinary meaning, but within the statutory con-
text.104  Therefore, a person engaged in actions such as the defend-
ant’s would be on reasonable notice that he lacked a “legitimate pur-
pose” under the statutory rubric, which bears a clear account of its 
proscribed conduct.105  While the challenged statute’s clarity was 
unanimous among the court, the concurrence exhibited doctrinal dis-
sension with the majority’s affirmation of the “no valid applications 
rule.”106 
The concurrence took issue with the limitations that the “no 
valid applications rule” placed on prospective facial challenges.107  
As applied challenges to statutes may be unsuccessful even though 
the statute is facially vague.108  This results from the manner in which 
 
96 Stuart, 797 N.E.2d at 39. 
97 Id. 
98 Id. 
99 Id. 
100 Id. 
101 Stuart, 797 N.E.2d at 30. 
102 Id. at 39. 
103 The court defined the ordinary meaning of “no legitimate purpose” as “the absence of 
expression of ideas or thoughts other than threats and/or intimidating or coercive utterances” 
Id. at 41. 
104 Id. 
105 Id. 
106 Stuart, 797 N.E.2d at 41-42 (Kaye, J., concurring). 
107 Id. at 44. 
108 See id. (illustrating an instance where a facially vague statute nonetheless survives an 
as applied challenge because the conduct fits “squarely within the ‘hard core’ of the statute’s 
proscriptions”) (quoting Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 608). 
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vagueness shades particular circumstances, as the concurrence ex-
plained, “[A] facially vague statute fails to give anyone notice of its 
limits, even though everyone might understand its core, and even 
though it may not be unconstitutional as applied to this core.”109  Em-
phasizing the primary importance of clear guidelines for law en-
forcement, the test’s second prong, the concurrence further stressed 
that although valid as applied, a statute may nonetheless lack the 
clear standards for enforcement.110  As the concurrence illustrated, 
“the second prong mandates that a statute not permit or encourage 
arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement by the police.  The test is not 
whether an officer actually exercised discretion arbitrarily in a given 
case.”111 
This point echoes the language previously used, “though eve-
ryone might understand its core,” in that although an official’s re-
sponse in a particular case may not be discriminatory as it related to a 
given set of facts, the relevant inquiry is whether the statute provides 
the official with sufficient guidelines.112  Thus, the concurrence con-
cluded “an analysis of the second prong ‘as applied’ to a defendant 
has no discernible meaning; the very nature of a second-prong analy-
sis is inherently a facial one.”113  The foregoing illustrates the court’s 
disagreement over the appropriate analysis for vagueness challenges.  
Indeed, the opinions differ on the appropriate New York and federal 
precedent attached to the issue,114 which indicates greater opacity ac-
companies the initially clear two-pronged vagueness analysis. 
B. Overbreadth 
New York’s overbreadth doctrine is taken from federal juris-
prudence and is less contentious than its vagueness analysis.  Similar 
to its federal counterpart, the doctrine is an exception to the general 
rule against third-party standing stemming from the concern that a 
law’s expansive scope may dissuade people from exercising their 
First Amendment rights.115  Its main inquiry focuses on “whether the 
 
109 Id. at 43 (emphasis in original). 
110 Id.  
111 Stuart, 797 N.E.2d at 44 (emphasis in original). 
112 Id. at 43. 
113 Id. at 44 (emphasis in original). 
114 Id. at 38 n.10. 
115 Foley, 731 N.E.2d at 128. 
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law on its face prohibits a real and substantial amount of constitu-
tionally protected conduct.”116  If the prohibition stems from a con-
tent-neutral regulation of “time, place, and manner of expression,” it 
is enforceable as long as it is “narrowly tailored to serve a significant 
government interest, and leave[s] open ample alternative channels of 
communication.”117  The prohibition is content-neutral if it does not 
stem from the government’s disagreement with that speech or con-
duct; in other words, the primary inquiry is into the government’s 
motive for enacting the restriction.118  Upon finding that a restriction 
is content-neutral, courts examine whether the “regulation promotes a 
substantial government interest” by means that are not broader than 
necessary to fulfill that interest.119  The means adopted do not have to 
be the least restrictive available, but rather the legislature is afforded 
flexibility in determining which methods are best suited to constitu-
tionally achieving its valid aims.120  In New York’s highest court, the 
doctrine has not seen the same contention as vagueness challenges 
have.  However, the broad language attending overbreadth jurispru-
dence leaves lower courts with the leeway to use it in a more liberal 
fashion than it was perhaps intended for.  The court in Gabriel exem-
plified this notion. 
IV. MISAPPLICATIONS: OVERBREADTH AND VAGUENESS 
Rather than providing a mechanism for judicial action,121 the 
overbreadth doctrine is intended to serve as additional protection for 
First Amendment rights.122  As Gabriel illustrates, however, broad 
language allows for expansion and contraction within that language, 
 
116 People v. Barton, 861 N.E.2d 75, 79 (N.Y. 2006) (emphasis added). 
117 Id. at 80 (quoting Int’l Soc. for Krishna Consciousness of New Orleans, Inc. v. City of 
Baton Rouge, 876 F.2d 494, 497 (5th Cir. 1989)). 
118 Barton, 861 N.E.2d at 80. 
119 Id. at 81 (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 799 (1989)). 
120 Id. 
121 One commentator aptly noted: “The overbreadth doctrine is quite clearly outside the 
pantheon of ‘passive virtues.’  Rather than serving to postpone and limit the scope of judicial 
review, it asks that review be hastened and broadened.  It results often in the wholesale in-
validation of the legislature’s handiwork, creating a judicial-legislative confrontation.”  The 
First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARV. L. REV. 844, 852 (1970). 
122 See Broadrick, 413 U.S. 601 (outlining the aims and uses of the overbreadth doctrine); 
see also Barton, 861 N.E.2d at 81 (“The validity of [time, place, or manner] regulations does 
not turn on a judge’s agreement with the responsible decision maker concerning the most 
appropriate method for promoting significant government interests or the degree to which 
those interests should be promoted.”). 
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leading to unduly active decisions.  For instance, the court in Gabriel 
questioned the legislative rationale behind the statute, contemplating 
situations that spoke to the statute’s substantive validity and effica-
cy.123  Testing a statute’s significant governmental interest in such a 
manner is contrary to the language in Barton, which Gabriel relied 
upon in its overbreadth analysis.124  The court’s apparent overzeal-
ousness in Gabriel in applying the overbreadth doctrine can be tied to 
its interpretation of broad precedential language.  Considering the 
calls for reluctance associated with the doctrine, the court may have 
applied it too readily.  Courts have cautioned that the doctrine is a 
drastic measure, or “strong medicine,” reserved for laws that infringe 
upon a substantial amount of protected speech.125  That the law here 
is a content-neutral restriction on conduct bolsters those caveats, as 
the doctrine’s already limited applicability attenuates when the be-
havior at issue is conduct rather than pure speech.126  The opinion in 
Gabriel failed to even mention, and thus presumably consider, these 
reservations.  Rather, in invalidating the statute entirely the court opt-
ed for the most drastic measure.  Alternatively, and to avoid frustrat-
ing legislative objectives and resultant delays, it could have crafted a 
less restrictive interpretation or demarcated a line of application from 
which subsequent decisions could act from.127  Either would have 
been preferable here, where the conduct was not pure-speech and in 
its expressive form, conservation, there existed alternative avenues of 
communication.  Similar to its application of the overbreadth doc-
trine, the court too readily invalidated the statute on vagueness 
grounds. 
Facial invalidation requires the litigant to show that a statute 
 
123 Gabriel, 950 N.Y.S.2d at 884 (“There is a genuine dispute as to whether this regulation 
serves a significant governmental interest in preventing the spread of CWD.  Without ad-
dressing the merits of CWD regulations as applicable in New York, the Court must ask if the 
gathering of deer around a legal food plot as opposed to the proverbial apple tree is not also a 
concern for CWD transmission?”). 
124 See Barton, 861 N.E.2d at 81.  Additionally, criticizing the apparent overbreadth and 
inconsistency of the statute, the court in Gabriel reasoned that “[i]t is also not disputed that 
planting food crops, fruit trees, or cutting brush for deer to eat does not ‘concentrate the ani-
mals and create extensive face-to-face contact’ with deer; this type of feeding is encouraged 
by the DEC to conserve the deer population.”  Gabriel, 950 N.Y.S.2d at 885.  However, 
drawing on Barton, whether certain proscriptions against feeding deer appear inconsistent 
with other such lawful practices is outside the judicial purview. 
125 Foley, 731 N.E.2d at 128; Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 613. 
126 Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 615. 
127 The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, supra note 121, at 862. 
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is invalid in all of its applications.128  Accordingly, and as a pre-
requisite, litigants must first demonstrate the inapplicability of the 
statute as applied to their situation; the inability to do so means the 
statute is facially valid.129  In Gabriel, however, the court addressed 
the statute’s facial challenge prior to the as applied challenge, holding 
“[b]ecause the regulation [was] facially vague and therefore unconsti-
tutional, its application to Appellant is also unconstitutional.”130  
While that assertion is true, it is premised on the assumption that the 
statute is unconstitutionally vague as applied to Gabriel.  Having es-
tablished the statute’s facial invalidity, the court had to show its inva-
lidity as applied to Gabriel, otherwise its holding of facial invalidity 
would have been erroneous.  The proper analytical cadence is im-
portant because it ensures a certain degree of measure before invali-
dating a statute in toto, which courts are rightly hesitant to do.131  
Here, the court’s proclivity to invalidate the statute was illustrated by 
its overbreadth and vagueness analyses.  Upon determining the stat-
ute was facially invalid, the court gave a terse and conclusory state-
ment as to why the statute was invalid as applied to Gabriel, which 
was essentially a repetition of its prior analysis on facial invalidity.  
This analysis is further undermined by the court’s apparent admission 
of the statute’s validity as applied to Gabriel: “While the statute as 
applied in this case does validly prohibit conduct not protected under 
the First Amendment . . . .”132  Further, by the court’s admission and 
the statute’s clear language, the law was intended to prohibit feeding 
deer, which Gabriel admitted to doing.133  Any reasonable person 
would have been on notice that the statute proscribed feeding deer.  
Thus, as applied to Gabriel the statute appears constitutionally clear, 
and as a result facially valid. 
Similar to its overbreadth treatment, the court’s resolution of 
Gabriel’s vagueness challenge was drastic and failed to give suffi-
 
128 Stuart, 797 N.E.2d at 37; see also Morales, 527 U.S. at 77 (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(characterizing facial challenges as “go-for-broke” propositions requiring the litigant to show 
no valid application exists). 
129 Stuart, 797 N.E.2d at 37. 
130 Gabriel, 950 N.Y.S.2d at 883. 
131 See Stuart, 797 N.E.2d at 36 (“[F]acial challenges to statutes are generally disfavored 
and legislative enactments carry a strong presumption of constitutionality.”); see also Mo-
rales, 527 U.S. at 77 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (urging restraint from facial invalidation). 
132 Gabriel, 950 N.Y.S.2d at 885.  But see id. at 884 (“The regulation is therefore also un-
constitutional as applied to Appellant.”). 
133 Id. at 883, 885; N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 6, § 189.3. 
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cient consideration to alternative solutions, such as applying a nar-
rowing construction.134  “Restraint is a counsel of prudence,”135 and 
in the instant case the court would have exercised such had it given 
more thought to why facial invalidity and the overbreadth doctrine 
are approached cautiously and applied sparingly. 
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134 The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, supra note 121, at 862. 
135 Id. at 849. 
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